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HONECKER'S LEGACY
STEPHEN R. BOWERS

From 1971 until 1989, under the leadership of Erich Honecker, the German
Democratic Republic shed its thoroughly dogmatic image and developed a
tradition of implementing reforms, particularly economic ones, and
successfully blended technology with political orthodoxy when the rest of
East Europe was locked in a Stalinist model. Yet, by the time of his removal
from power in October, 1989, this former advocate of reforms was widely
viewed as the leading opponent of reformist movements within the Soviet
bloc. In making this transition from subservient Soviet ally to "maverick",
Honecker's regime demonstrated not only an ability to resist reformist
pressures and formulate policies that defied the Kremlin's leadership, but also
a confidence to make decisions in accordance with the institutional interests of
the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). It is, therefore, reasonable to suggest
that Honecker should be remembered, not for his eventual expulsion from the
party he once led and his subsequent arrest for treason, but for his
development of an institutional maturity that repudiated suggestions during
the GDR's first decades that this state was nothing more than a westward
extension of the Kremlin. The achievement of institutional maturity by the
Honecker regime was made possible by legitimate East German
accomplishments in domestic policy and the grounding of SED policy within
the framework of clear and emphatic Soviet endorsement of an East German
"model" that enjoyed the Kremlin's respect. The eventual withdrawal of that
support by Mikhail Gorbachev undermined a system that was beginning to
establish itself as an unloved but nevertheless genuine socialist state on
German soiL
The Soviet Union's more flexible policy toward its Eastern European
allies, one of the basic elements of the Gorbachev reforms, gave Honecker
full authority to advocate independent positions. During the latter Honecker
years, the" GDR leadership insisted that it was formulating policies in
accordance with the unique East German conditions. SED spokesmen
frequently cited their nation's strong economy as the main factor that barred
the necessity of imitating economic reforms such as those advocated by
Gorbachev for the USSR's struggling economy. Other more subtle factors,
such as the GDR's proximity to an especially attractive West Germany, also
gave coherence to a policy that attempted to maintain rather than diminish the
differences between their own society and those of the non-communist West.
The flight of thousands of East German citizens to the FRG in Honecker's

40

Stephen R. Bowers

final days and the subsequent rush toward reunification underscored the
validity of this concern.
As a loyal junior partner of the Soviet Union, East Germany was free to
make explicit its opposition to reforms being pursued by the USSR. The
SED's opposition was outlined in an internal SED memorandum distributed
among middle-ranking party officials following Erich Honecker's talk with
Bishop Werner Leich in 1988. In the document, which was released by the
West German press in June, 1988, Honecker stressed his agreement with
Gorbachev's view that every country must act in accordance with its own
conditions of national development but argued that the GDR's ideological
"consolidation" gave East Germany a different set of requirements from those
of the USSR. Therefore, Honecker concluded that the GDR must approach
its problems differently from other socialist countries and rejected basic
features of the Soviet reform program. The SED statement rejected
suggestions by East German church leaders that the GDR should accept the
political implications of Soviet reforms by changing various features of the
party's social policies, including educational policies that discriminated
against Christians in East German schools.l
As enthusiastic public discussions of Soviet restructuring efforts spread
throughout both the Communist and non-Communist worlds, the Kremlin's
East German allies were remarkably reserved with regard to these historic
Soviet innovations. Following the CPSU Conference in June, 1988 it became
clear that the SED was reluctant to support Gorbachev's reform efforts as
Honecker's public comments on the Conference were limited to bland
generalizations about the strengthening of socialism. He made no reference to
any of the reforms embodied in Gorbachev's program nor, for t~at matter, to
Gorbachev himself. While the Conference proceedings were broadcast live
throughout the GDR and the party daily printed the full text of Gorbachev's
speech, the SED leadership did not comment on the conference and avoided
all references to perestroika, glasnost, or Gorbachev. 2
In the autumn of 1988 the SED Central Committee further elaborated its
opposition when General Secretary Honecker denounced the advice of
"influential" Westerners, such as West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl,
who wanted the GDR to transform into a more "pragmatic" regime. Several
prominent party figures such as Gunter Schabowski chose this opportunity to
attack the application of glasnost to the study of Soviet and East European
history. According to the SED view of history, a re-examination of the basic
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assumptions about the consolidation of Marxist-Leninist power in the USSR
and Eastern Europe is a dangerous error. Such an undertaking, according to
Schabowski, would only aid those West German foes of the GDR
determined to misuse such concepts as "perestroika" and "glasnost" in an
effort to undermine socialism. While stressing the unshakable foundations of
the Soviet-GDR alliance, the SED Central Committee maintained that the
international reputation of the GDR and its political and economic successes
were the result of the SED's "prudent policy". This policy, the Central
Committee insisted, was "based on Marxism-Leninism, the specific
conditions of the GDR", and a recognition of the fact that "the class struggle
is escalating in an ideological sense". The latter observation was an obvious
rejection of Gorbachev's suggestion that the role of the party be reduced and
the Soviet leadership's emphasis on "humanitarian" issues in contrast to
"class" issues. Such a reduction in the role of the party would, in the view of
several SED spokesmen, transform the party from an instrument of socialist
construction into a mere debating society.3
Under Honecker's leadership East German opposition to the reexamination of history was exhibited in two incidents. One was the
government's announcement in November, 1988 of a prohibition against the
import into the GDR of the popular Soviet monthly press digest Sputnik.
Although specific issues of Soviet periodicals had been banned in the past
when they dealt with sensitive issues, there had never been a general ban of
this nature. Shortly after this announcement, there were protest
demonstrations in East Berlin, Leipzig, Jena, Weimar, and Halle as well as
numerous withdrawals from the SED by party members who objected to the
action against Sputnik, events that served as a prelude to the dramatic
displays of popular unrest that occurred less than a year later.4 The second
incident was sparked by the activism of the Soviet film industry and was
directed against the film "Repentance", cm.e of the USSR's most critical
examinations of Stalinism and a feature on West German television in 1987.
"Repentance" was denounced by both Neues Deutschland and Junge Welt,
the journal of the party youth organization, as a "stone-age view mocking all
those millions of people who risked their lives for mankind's progress" and a
"mocking denunciation of revolutionary vigilance." In the SED's view, there
were "practical and theoretical mistakes" during the Stalin period, but Stalin
should receive credit for leading the USSR through collectivization and
industrialization and for securing the unanimity of the party when socialism
was faced with daily threats to its very survival. It was only through Stalin's
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Neues Deutschland, December 3-4, 1988, pp. 3-16 and RFE, RAD Background
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Zeitung, January 10, 1989, p. 2
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leadership, the SED insisted, that the Soviet Union was able to overcome
foreign "intervention, sabotage, opportunism, Trotskyism, and bourgeois
nationalism". According to a Neues Deutschland editorial, the only purpose
served by "Repentance" was the provision of new ammunition for the
enemies of socialism, especially those in West Germany who sought to smear
the SED for its association with what was being presented as a "terrorist"
Soviet regime. 5
East German criticisms targeted both economic and political reforms
advanced by its WTO allies. A general observation in Neues Deutschland
summarized the SED position with its insistance that the party should always
play the leading role in society, that industry should be operated by the state
rather than by private enterprises whether East German or Western, and that
the economic foundations of the regime should be based not on capitalistic
laws of supply and demand but upon an arrangement of subsidized prices.
Unemployment, a basic element of many Eastern European economic
reforms, did not, in the SED's view, represent a rational alternative to the
problem of inefficient industry but was a violation of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to work. 6

Confidence as a motive for opposition
A significant indication of the GDR's institutional development by the end of
the Honecker era was that the regime displayed a greater confidence in its
own achievements. In spite of the obvious problems the government faced,
the dramatic flight of thousands of its citizens in 1989 being one of the most
conspicuous, the regime did enjoy some advantages, especially when the
GDR is compared with the other communist party regimes of East Europe.
One that was rarely noted and infrequently documented was the level of
popular support that the government enjoyed as a result of its active social
welfare programs. The exodus of 1989 and the large public protests
immediately prior to Honecker's removal have obscured indications of
support that the policies of the SED had won among some segments of the
GDR's population. A West German polling organization, the Infas Polling
Institute, examined this question in the spring of 1989 and found that a
surprising 53% of its sample of 880 East German adults expressed a positive
view of the government's work. At the same time, 44% of the respondents
indicated a desire to see the SED adopt some of the reforms being undertaken
by the Poles and the Hungarians while only 22% specifically rejected those
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efforts. Granted, there are obvious qualifications that must be made with
regard to this type of research in the GDR. What does one conclude, for
example, from the fact that an additional 800 or more people who were
contacted simply refused to respond? Yet, this fragmentary indication could
well support the suggestion that the regime enjoyed some popular support,
even among citizens expressing a desire far reforms. Comments of East
German young people, widely reported in the Western press in the autumn of
1989, about their continued preference for a separate East German state, in
spite of its shortcomings, offer further support for the view that the GDR
enjoyed some genuine popular support during that time. Equally significant
was another survey, conducted in the more open if turbulent atmosphere of
mid-November, which indicated that a majority of the GDR's younger
citizens rejected the notion of dismantling the GDR in order to reunify
Germany. A December survey conducted by the GDR Academy of Social
Science found that 69.2% of the respondents wanted the GDR to persist as a
separate nation while only 23.5% supported reunification with the FRG.?
A more direct justification for the regime's optimism and confidence was
Honecker's insistence that the SED political and economic policies had been
effective. With this propositon as a starting point, the SED established an
argument that only minimal adjustments were required to conform either to
necessity or to general Soviet guidance. Accordingly, there were few SED
voices calling for major reforms and the few that were heard were relatively
restrained. The Central Committee's sixth plenum indicated the weakness of
reformist elements in the GDR's ruling party. At the plenum, the leadership
noted that East Germany was plagued by various economic problems such as
shortages of good quality consumer goods but issued no demands for a
restructuring of the nation's economic or political mechanisms. According to
SED Central Committee Secretary Joachim Herrmann, the East German
leadership had no need to alter its economic course because the MarxistLeninist method had always been right as long as "it has not been applied
dogmatically." What the GDR needed, he stressed, in order to overcome its
economic difficulties was greater discipline and the introduction of
microelectronics in all branches of the national economy. In commenting on
the extensive reforms of its allies, Herrmann noted that the GDR was
"waiting for the results" of those efforts before considering their relevance to
their needs. 8
For the most part, during this pre-glasnost era in the GDR, the leadership
stressed only the most positive economic news and muted indications of
negative economic trends. Accordingly, in assessing economic performance
7
8
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for 1989, authorities boasted that during the first quarter the economy had
already achieved the percentage share of the growth rate planned for the
whole year and that national income had risen by an impressive 4 percent
while net production and labour productivity had increased by 6 percent. The
application of key technologies, Neues Deutschland claimed, was continuing
at "a rapid pace".9 By mid-year, authorities were boasting that in its 40th
year the GDR had proven itself to be a "modem socialist state on German soil
which is developing in a politically stable way, with great economic
dynamism and a continuing performance growth in all field.of social life." It
was not until after Honecker's removal and the flight of over 200,000 East
German citizens, many of whom were their best workers, that the SED was
forced to acknowledge a crisis situation in which sweeping reforms were
needed to avoid an economic disaster that would threaten the very
foundations of the GDR.10
Yet, even in Honecker's last days, the regime was not oblivious to the
economic difficulties that most citizens perceived through direct experience.
Authorities were willing to engage in glasnost, but limited it to discussions of
matters such as the availability of adequate housing and other social services.
For example, while public pronouncements declared the unqualified success
of the nation's economic plan, a confidential resolution of the SED Politburo
instructed localleaderships to admit economic difficulties and bottlenecks that
plague the economy. As the Politburo instructed local authorities to pay
attention to critical remarks from citizens, it insisted that leading journalists
take the lead in reporting on supply shortages in the official media and
identifying responsible officials. Shortages of vegetables, industrial goods,
and spare parts as well as poor public services were the targets of this effort.
This directive may have been an early indication that the GDR was
considering the eventual introduction of elements of a market economy before
events raced out of control following Honecker's removal. 11
The SED's optimism often assumed some curious manifestations as East
German authorities expressed a belief that their public health situation was a
tribute to the regime's efficient practices and clear evidence of the GDR's
superiority to Western society. For example, in 1989 one official boasted that
the GDR had been almost completely spared from the AIDS epidemic.
According to Niels Soennichsen, the nation's most prominent AIDS
specialist, only 55 East German citizens were infected with HIV as of
January, 1989 while no more than 10 actually suffered from AIDS. This
fortunate situation, authorities insisted, was the result of a strategy that
combined effective testing and proper treatment and a popular attitude in

9
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which most citizens want to "do something for their health and a healthy way
of life ... " In much the same spirit, East German spokesmen also boasted that
their scientists had achieved cold fusion, thereby once again surpassing the
West on an important concern. 12

Foreign policy considerations
For the most part, throughout the latter part of the Honecker era, GDR
foreign policy embraced the notion of East-West detente, thus strengthening
the SED argument that sweeping reforms were not required. When Politburo
member Herman Axen visited the United States in 1988 he made a vigorous
case that the US should award Most Favored Nation trade status to the GDR.
Achievement of this goal would have helped East Germany meet economic
demands through the import of more Western technology and would have
improved its trade relationship with the non-Communist world. In addition to
satisfying important economic objectives, such a development would have
enabled the SED to strengthen its case against the reforms being implemented
elsewhere in East Europe by demonstrating the utility of a non-reformist
approach to economic advancement. The East German commitment to detente
was most vividly illustrated by the SED's dispute with the USSR in 1984
over the question of retaliation for NATO's deployment of new missiles in
Europe. Honecker's opposition to the Kremlin on this vital security issue was
later vindicated by Gorbachev's active pursuit of detente with the West and
the USSR's abandonment of the more hard-line positions of the early 1980's.
During this period, Honecker established the GDR as a nation whose policies
were firmly grounded on a need for good relations with the West in general
and with the FRG in particular. 13
Yet, in some respects, the GDR' s foreign policy during Honecker's last
years took a turn that was not consistent with post-Ulbricht foreign affairs.
As pressures for reforms intensified and the radical nature of Gorbachev's
program became more evident, that crucial icon of East Europe's reformist
era, detente with the West, began to wear thin. A clear expression of this
tendency was the increasing number of critical statements on the foreign
policies of the West. Debates in the US Congress over the Bush
Administration defence budget prompted a Neues Deutschland commentary
denouncing the United States' determination to develop large-scale weapons
systems instead of providing "social benefits for three million homeless" .14 A

12
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similar critical view was apparent in comments about the Federal Republic of
Germany. When West German specialists on the GDR offered a sceptical
analysis of East German economic performance, Neues Deutschland
responded by warning about those in the FRG who are only interested in the
"elimination of socialism, as well as the integration of the GDR, parts of the
Polish People's Republic and the USSR into the FRG". The SED's
increasingly defensive posture also led to cancellation of the planned visit by
senior West German Social Democratic Party leaders that had been scheduled
for September, 1989. By this time East German officials were denouncing
what they saw as West German "economic aggression" and increasingly
active West German "revanchist" tendencies that threatened the GDR's
securi ty,1 5
The weakening of detente was not consistent with East German interests
in an era of East European reforms. The GDR's economy profited from the
climate of international cooperation and that economic profit bolstered the
SED's anti-reformist arguments. Yet, the resurgence of limited East-West
hostility supported the SED's need for an enemy as a supplement to the
regime's legitimacy. A return to some elements of the old "front-line" rhetoric
of the 1960s enabled the SED to enlist support for its anti-reformist policies
by attempting to rouse the spectre of West German "revanchism", an appeal
that is doubtless effective with East Germans who might harbour a bitterness
and resentment toward their more prosperous Western relatives. The size of
this group among the GDR elite, while difficult to determine, was probably
declining by the end of the decade and, at the popular level, hardly constituted
the basis for development of a sense of national identity. The rapid collapse
of this position in late 1989 and early 1990 indicates that Honecker's efforts
to utilize the "front-line" rhetoric of an earlier era were a mistake.
While Gorbachev's enthusiastic search for a deeper working relationship
with the West threatened to undermine some East German policies, the GDR
did benefit from one especially important element of Gorbachev's "new
thinking", the changed Soviet-East European relationship. This new posture
was spelled out in Gorbachev's book, Perestroika, and indicated a Soviet
willingness to broaden the limits of diversity in East Europe. The end result
of current Soviet pronouncements was the final repudiation of the Brezhnev
Doctrine and its replacement by what one Soviet spokesman jokingly referred
to as the "Sinatra doctrine", a more flexible and tolerant attitude that invites
East European allies to adopt - within certain very broad limits - whatever
policies that may be required by their special circumstances. The East
European states were, in effect, encouraged to "do it their way" as long as
they stayed within the loose framework of what was left of the Soviet bloc in
the Gorbachev era.

15

IBID., August 3, 1989, p. 3 and The Washington Post, September 16, 1989, pAl8

Honecker's Legacy

47

The most obvious consequence of the new Soviet-GDR relationship was
that the SED became more or less free to adopt fully independent policies, as
discussed above. In practical terms, this meant that Gorbachev was defending
the East German right to disagree with his reform initiatives. Another result
of Gorbachev's policy was a reduction of Soviet forces in East Germany. By
May, 1989, Soviet troops began withdrawing from the GDR as part of the
disarmament initiative announced by Gorbachev in December, 1988. Under
this plan, the 25th Tank Division, the 32nd Tank Division, two independent
tank training regiments, and eight independent battalions which together had
4,000 tanks, were to return to the USSR by the end of the year. 16 Given the
often difficult relationship between East German citizens and Soviet soldiers,
this move should have enhanced the popular status of the SED by
diminishing popular perceptions that the country is simply a Kremlin outpost.
Yet, there was a negative consequence in that reduction of the Soviet military
contingent fostered the notion that the GDR had become less important in
Soviet thinking and that the Soviet commitment to the regime was being
reduced. In spite of the accomplishments of the GDR under Honecker, it is
important to note that direct Soviet military support was one of the pillars of
the regime's stability. A reduction in the Soviet military presence, coupled
with a divergence of Soviet and East German policies, was certain to
undermine the foundations of the regime.
The achievements of the Honecker era, including the newfound
independence of the government, were predicated on the assumption that it
enjoyed full Soviet support and was a firm member of a secure alliance
system. The close East German-Soviet relationship was long regarded as
essential to the viability of the GDR and it was generally recognized that the
regime had a clear need for membership in a cohesive and supportive East
European bloc. The deterioration in East Germany's relations with those bloc
nations that had embarked on a course of radical reforms - Poland and
Hungary - weakened the overall East German position by isolating it from
its support system. The eventual perception that the SED had also lost Soviet
support proved destructive to the foundations of a system that Honecker had
strengthened with Soviet suport in the eras of Brezhnev, Andropov, and
Chernenko and paved the way for a general public debate on the merits of
German reunification.
A basic assumption of Honecker's anti-reformist position was that the
reform measures of WTO nations such as Hungary were a dangerous
precedent. The ceremonial reburial of Imry Nagy, in the SED's view,
allowed the foes of socialism to demonstrate their hostility to that system and
was a reminder of the continuing threat to socialist society. Hungarian
discussions about legal actions against those responsible for Nagy's death
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underscored East German concerns about retributions against ageing
Stalinists. Suggestions in November, 1989 that both Honecker and
Bulgaria's recently deposed Todor Zhivkov faced disciplinary actions,
coupled with the execution of Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu in December,
emphasized the legitimacy of these concerns. A direct implication of
Hungarian reforms for the GDR could be seen in the summer of 1989 as
thousands of East German citizens, vacationing in Hungary, took advantage
of the almost completely open Hungarian-Austrian frontier as a safe escape
route to the Federal Republic. By August of 1989, East German efforts to
prevent flight from the GDR by way of Hungary resulted in the imprisonment
of an estimated 2,500 citizens who had attempted to escape. 17 On the
anniversary of the construction of the Berlin Wall, about 50 would-be
emigrants demonstrated in front of the Brandenburg Gate, chanting "We want
to get out". As this crisis grew, East German authorities, in an effort to
provide a more reliable vacation spot for their citizens, were forced to journey
to Tirana for a discussion of the prospects of developing a tourist
infrastructure in Albania that could accommodate groups of East German
vacationers. The failure of these efforts eventually led not only to Honecker's
political collapse but also to the collapse of the Wall that he helped construct
in 1961. 18

Fraud in the 1989 election
East German efforts to deal with the democratic spirit sweeping Eastern
Europe in 1989 demonstrated that while the regime enjoyed greater
institutional maturity than in the past, there were clear limits to the viability of
the GDR as a state and that the GDR could not isolate itself from events
taking place elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The elections in the spring of 1989
were a dramatic reminder of the continuing threats to the stability of the GDR.
While authorities endeavoured to present the elections as a resounding
endorsement of the regime, the reality appeared to be very different.
Independent observers reported that "no" votes in the elections were
significantly higher than authorities had acknowledged, running from a low
of 3% to a high of 20% at various polling stations. Election officials
acknowledged no more than 2% to 3% "no" votes. In addition, a much
higher than normal percentage of eligible voters evidently chose not to vote.
While there are no reliable national figures, unofficial returns reveal a turnout
that did not reach 90% or even 80% in some electoral districts. When
17
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independent observers were denied the right to monitor the election count in
Leipzig, security forces arrested those who chose to protest openly against
the violation of procedures. Opposition groups charged that election results
throughout the nation were altered in the official government counts and
called on elected candidates to refuse to accept their mandates until the
electoral procedures could be independently investigated. 19
In response to widespread charges of electoral fraud, 21 leading church
figures issued an appeal for a new election law that would prevent future
frauds. According to the group's statement, there was "large-scale and
doubtlessly centrally ordered election fraud" in the May elections and when
Honecker stresses that these "forged election results demonstrated the
political-moral unity of our people", many East German citizens must ask
"what kind of unity is this?" The authors of the appeal declared that without
changes, East German society would face increasing "confrontation and
polarization" that would further undermine the already weakened stability of
the regime. By 1990, many East German officials acknowledged that the May
elections had been rigged and that, as a result, there was no legitimate
government in the GDR.20 This electoral experience was hardly'reassuring as
the restructured SED faced the prospect of genuinely free elections.
According to projections in the fall of 1989, a politically bankrupt but renamed SED could expect somewhere between a low of 15% of the vote to a
high of 34%, according to an optimistic survey in Berliner Zeitung. With
reunification accepted as inevitable, East German spokesmen were
increasingly resigned to facing political obscurity in the new order of a greater
Germany.21

Conclusions
Following Gorbachev's rise to prominence in the USSR, the German
Democratic Republic under Erich Honecker's leadership increasingly found
itself in opposition to the reforms associated with the new Soviet leadership.
For a regime that was created as an expression of Soviet policy and little
more, this might seem to have been an extremely awkward position. Yet,
~uring his last decade, Honecker's SED assumed this position with an
mcreasing confidence and Honecker himself won recognition as a leader in
Eastern Europe, not simply a German-language spokesman for the Kremlin.
19
20
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Several observations are prompted by this development and the turbulent
events of 1989. First, it was apparent that the SED had the confidence to
resist Soviet initiatives. That confidence was at least in part the result of East
German accomplishments. By 1989 - before its massive population loss
and the economic losses associated with Krenz's opening of the Berlin Wall
- the GDR could boast what was, by East European standards, a strong
economy in spite of the existence of some shortcomings. As so many have
noted, the East German economy was and still is the envy of most East
Europeans. The SED's confidence was also a product of a new Soviet
position regarding East Europe. In Gorbachev's view, the USSR's allies
enjoyed not only the right but had an obligation to adopt policies most suited
to their special circumstances, especially when those policies might enrich
East European economies that can expect limited Soviet assistance. With the
USSR increasingly occupied by its own domestic problems, it was clear that
the East European leaders were, with some qualifications, largely being left to
their own devices. This decision placed most of East Europe's ruling parties,
including that of the GDR, in an awkward position since they lacked the
legitimacy enjoyed by the Soviet Communist Party.
Second, necessity more than simple confidence in its own
accomplishments prompted Honecker's SED to retain policies that were, in
the context of the 1980s, fundamentally dogmatic. Of all the East European
regimes, only the GDR has a frontier with another state that shares its
language, elements of its culture and history, and offers its citizens an
attractive alternative lifestyle. The flight of thousands East Germans in 1989
was a dramatic reminder of just how great the West German appeal remains
for thousands, if not millions, of East Germans. The development of a
reform program like that of Hungary, Honecker reasoned, would seriously
undermine the raison d'etre of the GDR by raising the obvious question of
why there should be two Germanies if their social, political, and economic
systems were similar. Widespread speculation about German reunification
following Honecker's departure in October confirm the validity of the East
German hardliners' concerns about the possible consequences of rapid
political change.
Third, the GDR's growing alienation from so many of its allies over the
issue of reforms, coupled with its allies' assistance to escaping East
Germans, was a grim reminder of the continuing instability of the GDR. It is
estimated that in the summer of 1989, at least 50,000 East Germans were able
to flee the GDR by way of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This
number continued to swell throughout the autumn and eventually disrupted
the East German economy. The disruptive popular demonstrations in the
wake of Gorbachev's visit in October, 1989 were another dramatic indication
of the GDR's uneasy situation. It has long been taken for granted by both the
SED and scholars of this system that a GDR apart from the Warsaw Pact
would not be a viable international actor. The current crisis of East European
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refonns tested that important assumption, first, by forcing the GDR into an
anti-refonnist sub-bloc consisting of itself, Czechoslovakia, and Romania
and, second, by propelling the SED regime down an uncontrolled reformist
route that will apparently end the existence of East Gennany as a separate
political entity.
In spite of revelations about his government's involvement in
international drug trafficking and illegal anns sales, Erich Honecker must be
remembered as the leader who advanced political and economic policies that
ensured the GDR's consistent, stable political development while also
solidifying East Germany's position as the "second Gennan economic
miracle."22 At the same time, he oversaw an international trend toward
diplomatic acceptance of this second German state not only in the capitals of
Eastern Europe and the Third World, but throughout the powerful nonCommunist Western nations. While the GDR may never have become truly
important in the eyes of leading Western powers, it was accepted and
recognized for its economic accomplishments and its rise from Soviet
"puppet" to full partner in the Soviet alliance system. The key qualification in
this Marxist-Leninist "success story" is that the GDR's position continued to
be dependent on the full support of the USSR. By the GDR'.s 40th
anniversary, it was clear to many among the SED political elite as well as
much of the East German population that Honecker no longer enjoyed
unqualified Soviet support. According to an account by a West Gennan
official, Gorbachev took advantage of unrest in the GDR to undennine
Honecker and secretly manoeuvred within the SED leadership to propel Egon
Krenz and Hans Modrow into positions from which they could oust
Honecker. 23 Through the subsequent war of nerves, Gorbachev was able to
engineer Honecker's removal and set the stage for creation of a new East
Gennan regime that would initiate sweeping domestic changes and, for as
long as it endured, give enthusiastic support to the Soviet Union's refonn
model.
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